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Can you see what I am talking 
about? Human speech triggers 
referential expectation in four-
month-old infants
Hanna Marno1, Teresa Farroni2, Yamil Vidal Dos Santos3, Milad Ekramnia4, Marina Nespor5 
& Jacques Mehler6
Infants’ sensitivity to selectively attend to human speech and to process it in a unique way has been 
widely reported in the past. However, in order to successfully acquire language, one should also 
understand that speech is a referential, and that words can stand for other entities in the world. 
While there has been some evidence showing that young infants can make inferences about the 
communicative intentions of a speaker, whether they would also appreciate the direct relationship 
between a specific word and its referent, is still unknown. In the present study we tested four-month-
old infants to see whether they would expect to find a referent when they hear human speech. Our 
results showed that compared to other auditory stimuli or to silence, when infants were listening 
to speech they were more prepared to find some visual referents of the words, as signalled by their 
faster orienting towards the visual objects. Hence, our study is the first to report evidence that 
infants at a very young age already understand the referential relationship between auditory words 
and physical objects, thus show a precursor in appreciating the symbolic nature of language, even if 
they do not understand yet the meanings of words.
Human language is a special auditory stimulus for which infants show a unique sensitivity, compared to 
any other types of auditory stimuli. Various studies found that newborns are not only able to distinguish 
languages they never heard before based on their rhythmical characteristics1–4, but they can also detect 
acoustic cues that signal word boundaries5, discriminate words based on their patterns of lexical stress6 
and distinguish content words from function words by detecting their different acoustic characteristics7. 
Moreover, they can also recognize words with the same vowels after a 2 min delay8. In fact, infants are 
more sensitive to the statistical and prosodic patterns of language than adults, which provides an expla-
nation of why acquiring a second language is more difficult in adulthood than during infancy9. In addi-
tion to this unique sensitivity to the characteristics of language, infants also show a particular preference 
for language, compared to other auditory stimuli. For example, infants at the age of 2-months, and even 
newborns prefer to listen to speech compared to non-speech stimuli, even if the non-speech stimuli 
retain many of the spectral and temporal properties of the speech signal10,11.
Thus, there is growing evidence that infants are born with a unique interest and sensitivity to process 
human language. But what are exactly the grounds and the scopes of this privileged status of speech? 
Why do infants orient themselves towards speech stimuli with a distinguished attention? And why are 
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they tuned to process it in a unique way, compared to any other auditory stimuli? One may argue that 
due to its human-specific nature, speech can be perceived as a “trait” of our conspecifics, and as such, it 
may help social bonding or enable to establish group membership. In this way, similarly to other social 
traits (such as race or gender, e.g.12–14), speech can be especially interesting to infants, because it may pro-
vide some guidance in the surrounding social world. Indeed, numerous studies showed that infants not 
only prefer their native language15, but that during social learning, when they observe a model, sharing 
the same language with this model can also influence their attitudes and choices (e.g.16–18).
However, besides this social saliency of language, it might be that infants are receptive towards speech 
because they also understand that speech can communicate about something. More specifically, they 
might understand that speech can convey information about the surrounding world and that words 
can refer to specific entities. Indeed, without this understanding, they would have great difficulty to 
accept relations between objects and their labels, and thus language acquisition would become impos-
sible. Furthermore, without understanding the referential relations between words and objects, learning 
about the surrounding world would become extremely difficult. Hence, we propose that in order to 
successfully acquire language, conceiving of speech as a meaningful referential symbolic system must be 
a predisposition of infants already present at a very early age. Furthermore, as a guiding principle for 
learning, speech should also effectively bias infants to seek potential referents of the words they hear.
With the aim to study infants’ knowledge about the function of speech, numerous studies have inves-
tigated infants’ understanding of the role of speech in communication. These studies showed that infants 
at the age of 12-months9–20 and even 6-month-olds21 can understand that speech can communicate about 
unobservable intentions of the speaker. Furthermore, a recent study also gave evidence that those infants, 
who show greater interest to listening to speech sounds, compared to non-speech, will score higher on 
expressive vocabulary measures at the age of 18 months22. Thus, attentiveness towards speech can be also 
a precursor of later language development.
However, in order to successfully acquire a language and the meaning of concepts, more than accept-
ing the communicative nature of speech and being attentive to it, one should also understand the direct 
referential relationship between words and the entities they stand for. In the past there has been some 
evidence showing that young infants already accept some relations between verbal labels and physical 
objects. For example, providing verbal labels can facilitate object categorization of 3-4-month-old infants, 
and this effect disappears when they listen to sequences of tones23,24. At the age of 12-months, they can 
also individuate objects when they hear two labels, but not when they hear two tones or perceive two 
emotional expressions25. Furthermore, at the same age, they can also associate words but not commu-
nicative sounds (e.g. ‘mmm’ or ‘aaah’) or consonantal sounds to novel objects26. Listening to verbal labels 
can also modulate object perception, as a study by Gliga et al.27 showed: 12-month-old infants displayed 
enhanced gamma-band oscillatory activity over the visual cortex when they saw objects along with verbal 
labels. Furthermore, 12- and 19-month-old infants can associate words with complex objects, rather than 
with their salient parts28. Moreover, words can guide their attention towards the commonalities among 
a set of named objects, and it was suggested that this guidance in turn builds up a symbolic reference to 
form a set of stable “word-to world” mappings29.
These findings suggest that during development, some recognition of object-label relations may 
precede language acquisition. But the evidence that infants would have a basic expectation about the 
symbolic nature of verbal labels and that they would know that words can directly stand for other enti-
ties (e.g. objects) in the world is still missing from the literature. In the present study we address this 
question: as a precursor of understanding the referential relation between spoken words and real objects 
in the world, do infants from a very young age expect to find the referents of the words they hear? If it 
is true that the early sensitivity to the characteristics of language demonstrated by human infants also 
indicates an expectation about the referentiality of language, then we predict that infants should look 
for potential referents in their environment only when they hear somebody talking but not when the 
auditory signal lacks the characteristics of human speech (ie. backward speech or no speech at all).
Experiment 1
Thirty, 4-month-old infants were tested using a looking time latency paradigm, and were shown videos 
of a female face, who was either talking in a normal way (Normal Speech Condition), or backward 
(Backward Speech Condition), or she was silently moving her lips (No Speech Condition), while she was 
looking at the infant. We selected backward speech because even though its auditory characteristics are 
very similar to those of normal speech, there is evidence that neither infants, nor adults process back-
ward speech similarly to natural languages4,30,31. In each trial, the movie ended with an averted eye-gaze 
of the speaker either to the left, or to the right side of the screen. Next, the face disappeared from the 
display and immediately after an object appeared in a direction congruent with the gaze (Fig. 1. and see 
examples of videos in the Supplementary Material). The latency of infants’ orienting to the objects was 
measured as the dependent variable.
Results of Experiment 1
We predicted that if infants have a referential expectation about language, they would expect to find the 
referent and therefore orient faster to the object in the Normal Speech than in the Backward Speech or 
the No Speech condition. This prediction was confirmed by our data (Fig. 2). A 3 × 1 Repeated Measures 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
3Scientific RepoRts | 5:13594 | DOi: 10.1038/srep13594
ANOVA analyzing the latency of infants’ orienting to the objects in the three conditions showed a main 
effect of condition [F(2, 58) = 4.403, p = 0.017, η2 = 0.132]. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise tests 
revealed that infants looked significantly faster at the object in the Normal Speech condition than in the 
Backward [t(29) = − 2.935, p = 0.006] and the No Speech condition [t(29) = − 2.640, p = 0.013]. Between 
the Backward and the No Speech condition there was no significant difference [t(29) = − 0.262, p = 0.795]. 
These results confirm that when infants hear normal language, they are faster in finding the referent of 
speech compared to when they hear non-linguistic stimuli or when they only see the silent movements 
of the lips. Thus, the speech can facilitate infants’ search for the referent of speech at the age of 4 months.
However, since in the stimuli we always used an object-directed gaze of the speaker, congruent with 
the direction of appearance of the object, it remains unclear whether without this object-directed eye-gaze 
we would get the same effect, or the combination of speech and an object-directed gaze of the speaker 
is needed. To answer this question, we designed a second experiment, where in addition to the averted 
gaze trials, we also included trials where the speaker was gazing at the infant during the entire movies. 
We predicted that in case an object-directed gaze is needed to elicit referential expectation, this would 
result a significant difference in infants’ looking time latency between the averted object-directed gaze 
conditions, and the new infant-directed gaze conditions. Additionally, in case we find that an averted 
(thus possibly object-directed) eye-gaze is necessary to evoke the searching behaviour for the referent, 
it would be interesting to estimate the power of this factor. To this end, we decided to use incongruent 
averted gaze trials as well, i.e. conditions where the direction of the eye-gaze was averted from the infant, 
but incongruent with the appearance of the object. The extent to which these trials slow down the search-
ing behaviour of infants indicates the strength of the effect of eye-gaze in eliciting referential expectation.
Figure 1. Design of Experiment 1. Each movie started with a fixation cross in the middle of the center 
of the screen, then a female face appeared and vocalized or silently moved her lips. Following this, she 
looked to the right or to the left direction of the screen. Then the face appeared and an object appeared, in a 
congruent direction with the eye-gaze.
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. Latency of fixation towards the visual object. Bars represent the average 
latency of thirty infants’ orienting towards the visual object in the three auditory conditions. Error bars 
indicate SEM.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Experiment 2
In order to clarify these questions, we collected N = 30 participants’ data in a second experiment with 
3 × 3 factors, referring to Language (Normal Speech, Backward Speech and No Speech), and Gaze 
(Congruent Object-Directed, Incongruent Object-Directed and Infant-Directed). An additional change 
of the stimuli was that with the aim to decrease the rejection rate of our subjects, we slightly increased 
the size of the face, in order that infants would find the task more attractive and that they would stay 
attentive during the entire experiment. The task was the same as in Experiment 1. While infants watched 
the stimuli, their looking time latency was measured in each trial towards the objects.
Results of Experiment 2
We analyzed the data in a 3 × 3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Language (Normal Speech vs. 
Backward Speech vs. No Speech) and Gaze (Object-Directed Congruent vs. Object-Directed Incongruent 
vs. Infant-Directed). There was a main effect of Language [F(2, 58) = 4.037, p = 0.023, η2 = 0.122] and a 
strong interaction of Language and Gazing [F(4, 116) = 7.166, p = 0.0001, η2 = 0.198]. Following this, we 
analyzed the effect of Language independently for each Gaze conditions. This analysis revealed a strong 
significant difference between the three levels of Language conditions in the Congruent Object-Directed 
Gaze condition [F(2, 58) = 11.844, p = 0.0001, η2 = 0.290]. In the Incongruent Object-Directed and in 
the Infant Directed Gaze conditions, however, we found no significant differences. We also performed 
2 × 3 analysis of variance with Language and Gaze to contrast the Language conditions separately, and 
we found a main effect of Language [F(1, 29) = 7.488, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.205] and a significant interaction 
of Language and Gaze [F(2, 58) = 13.418, p = 0.0001, η2 = 0.316] in the comparison of Normal Speech 
and Backward Speech. In the comparison of the Normal Speech and No Speech conditions, however, we 
found no significant difference, neither for Language or Gaze, nor for their interaction.
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise tests revealed that infants looked significantly faster at 
the object in the Congruent Object-Directed Gaze/Normal Speech condition than in the Congruent 
Object-Directed Gaze/Backward Speech condition [t(29) = − 5.064, p = 0.0001] or in the Congruent 
Object-Directed Gaze/No Speech condition [t(29) = − 3.903, p = 0.001]. Within the Normal Speech con-
dition latency of orienting towards the object in the Congruent Object-Directed Gaze condition was also 
significantly shorter compared to the Infant-Directed Gaze condition [t(29) = − 5.092, p = 0.0001], but 
only close to significant in the Incongruent Object-Directed Gaze condition [t(29) = − 2.456, p = 0.02].
We found no significant difference between the Backward Speech and the No Speech condition in 
the Congruent Object-Directed Gaze trials. Similarly, we found no difference between the Backward 
Speech and No Speech conditions in the Infant-Directed Gaze trials either. These results thus replicated 
the results of the first experiment, by showing that infants’ orientation towards the visual object is the 
fastest when they hear normal speech and follow the object-directed gaze of the speaker. Furthermore, 
the results of the second experiment also gave evidence that the object-directed gaze of the speaker is 
helpful to find the referent of the speech only if it is preceded by speech (Fig. 3). It is important to note 
that while the general pattern of the results of Experiment 1 was replicated, we found an overall increase 
of performance in Experiment 2. We assume that this increase is due to the fact that in Experiment 2 we 
enlarged the size of the face, thus infants found the experiment overall more attractive.
The fact that we did not find a main effect of Language in the comparison of the Normal Speech 
and No Speech conditions, including all Gaze conditions, rules out the possibility that the demonstrated 
effect would be a result of either a general increase of arousal in the Normal Speech condition, or a 
decrease of attention in the silent control condition. However, in order to provide further supporting 
evidence to this claim, we decided to analyze infants’ pupil dilation during the different auditory condi-
tions, as an indicator or their general attentiveness.
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. Latency of fixation towards the visual object. Bars represent the average 
latency of thirty infants’ orienting towards the visual object in the nine conditions of Speech type x Gaze 
type. Error bars indicate SEM.
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Pupil diameter is not only a function of the luminance reaching the eyes, but also reflects psycho-
logical processes such as attention, arousal and cognitive load32–34 (Beatty, 1982; Karatekin, 2004; Porter, 
Troscianko, & Gilchrist, 2007), as it has been reported in numerous studies with adult subjects in the past. 
More recently, it has also been demonstrated that pupil diameter can be informative about psychological 
processes also in the case of in infants. For example, changes in pupil size have been registered in stud-
ies of object-identity violation35, object-permanence tasks36 or in response to another infant’s distress37. 
Thus, the aim of the analysis of pupil size changes in the present experiment was to see whether the dif-
ferent time latencies infants showed in the behavioural task would be due to an of increase of arousal and 
general attention enhancement during the presentation of speech. As there is extensive evidence showing 
that infants have a distinguished preference towards speech stimuli, compared to other, non-speech audi-
tory stimuli, it is especially important to clarify whether the shorter latency in finding the visual objects 
is due to a generally more ‘alerted’ state that speech would induce in infants, or it is indeed due to a spe-
cific effect, reflecting their expectation to find a visual referent of speech. Thus, to answer this question 
we performed a pupil diameter analysis during the presentation of the female speaker in the different 
conditions. First, we analysed the period of the different auditory conditions (Speech, Backward Speech 
and No Speech), in order to see whether infants’ general attentiveness would have changed due to the 
different acoustic or silent cues. This analysis did not yield any significant differences between conditions. 
In fact, infants’ average pupil size was very similar in all the three conditions (Fig. 4). Next, we wanted to 
see whether the combined effect of the auditory conditions and gaze-cueing would result changes of the 
pupil size. To this end, we analysed changes of pupil diameter during the entire period of the presenta-
tion of both the acoustic cue (Speech, Backward Speech and No Speech) and the gaze (Object-directed 
vs. Infant-directed) (Fig. 5). A a 3 × 3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Language (Normal Speech vs. 
Backward Speech vs. No Speech) and Gaze (Object-Directed vs. Infant-Directed) revealed no main effect 
of Language or Gaze, but a significant interaction between the two factors [F(2, 42) = 7.710, p = 0.001, 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2. Changes of pupil diameter during the speech period. Bars represent the 
average ratio of infants’ pupil size during the period of the presentation of the female speaker in the different 
auditory (Speech, Backward Speech and No Speech) conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
Figure 5. Results of Experiment 2. Changes of pupil diameter during the speech and the gazing period. 
Bars represent the average ratio of infants’ pupil size during the entire period of the presentation of the 
female speaker in the different auditory (Speech, Backward Speech and No Speech) and the further Gaze 
(Object-Directed and Infant-Directed) conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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η2 = 0.269]. We found the same interaction when we directly compared the Speech condition with the 
Backward Speech [F(1, 24) = 5.771, p = 0.024, η2 = 0.194], and also in the comparison of the Speech 
and No Speech condition [F(1, 21) = 11.825, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.360]. In the comparison of the Backward 
Speech and No Speech condition, however, due to an overall increased pupil size in the Backward Speech 
condition we found a significant main effect of Language [F(1, 23) = 6.629, p = 0.017, η2 = 0.224], and 
only a marginally significant interaction of Language and Gaze [F(1, 23) = 4.336, p = 0.049, η2 = 0.159]. 
Further Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons also revealed that pupil size reacted differently to the 
Object-directed gaze vs. Infant-directed gaze of the speaker only when gazing was preceded by Speech 
[t(24) = 2.831, p = 0.009], but not when it was preceded by Backward Speech [t(26) = 0.491, p = 0.628], 
or by No Speech [t(23) = − 2.086, p = 0.048]. Thus, while these results clearly exclude the possibility that 
either normal speech would generally increase infants’ arousal, or that the backward speech and the 
silent movies would distract their attention, they give further evidence that infants’ searching behaviour 
for a potential referent is facilitated by the gaze-cueing of the speaker only when the cue appears in the 
context of speech.
Discussion
Confirming our hypothesis, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 showed that infants at the age of 4-months 
are ready to look for potential referents when they are presented with a combination of speech and a 
referential gaze of the speaker. In both experiments, the latency of orienting towards the object was the 
shortest when infants heard normal speech, along with an object-directed gaze of the speaker, which was 
congruent with the direction of the object.
A further intriguing finding of our second experiment is the role of eye-gaze in eliciting referential 
expectation. While infants in the normal speech condition were the slowest to orient towards an appear-
ing object when the speaker was gazing at them, we found the opposite pattern in the backward speech 
condition. When infants were exposed to the combination of backward speech and an infant-directed 
gaze of the speaker, they oriented faster to the object, compared to when the speaker was gazing away 
from them, even though this effect only reflected a trend and was not significant. Furthermore, when 
infants saw the speaker moving her lips without producing any sound, eye-gaze did not have any modu-
latory effect on their orienting towards the objects. What could be the unified explanation for this effect 
and the faster look in the normal speech condition? Eye-gaze following is a well studied subject of social 
cognition and cognitive development, and it has been proposed that by directing infants’ attention it can 
facilitate language acquisition38. Studies gave evidence that 8 and 12-month-old infants interpret eye-gaze 
as a communicative act, and that gazing can elicit referential expectation in the direction of the gaze39, 
but only if the object-directed gaze is preceded by an infant-directed gaze40. Furthermore, even newborns 
can distinguish between eye-gazes that are either directed toward them or averted from them41 and at the 
age of 4-months their cortical processes are enhanced when they perceive a direct eye-gaze, as opposed 
to when they see an averted gaze42,43. Thus, already around birth, eye-gaze seems to be a powerful cue in 
evoking and directing infants’ attention. Based on these findings, could our results be interpreted simply 
as an effect of the different types of eye-gazes infants perceived independently from the auditory stimuli 
they heard? Could it be that the different speech conditions merely provided a distracting context? This 
seems unlikely, since in this case, the latency results in Experiment 2 should show a similar pattern in 
all the auditory conditions. But the fact that infants reacted differently to the eye-gaze in the three dif-
ferent auditory conditions, more specifically that they were facilitated by the object-directed gaze in the 
Normal Speech condition, but slowed down in the Backward Speech condition while in the No Speech 
condition the gaze had no effect at all, means that eye-gaze type and speech type must have a combined 
effect on their behavior.
Similar to previous proposals43, we suggest that during the perception of a direct eye-gaze, infants can 
recognize the communicative intention, even before they could assess the content of these intentions. 
Eye-gaze thus is able to establish a communicative context, which can direct the attention of the infant. 
However, we also suggest that while an infant-directed gaze acts as a communicative cue signaling that 
the infant was addressed by someone, additional cues are required to elicit the referential expectation of 
the infant (i.e. to understand that the speaker is talking about something). Following this, we propose 
that when the infant hears speech (without being able to actually understand the content of speech) and 
observes a person directly gazing at her/him (like in the Infant-directed gaze condition in our exper-
iment), s/he will understand the communicative intention of the speaker (i.e. that s/he was addressed 
by the speaker), but s/he will still have to wait for additional referential cues to make an inference that 
the speaker is actually talking about something. This additional cue arrives when the direct eye contact 
is broken: the very moment when the speaker averts her gaze to a new direction, the infant will infer 
that some new and relevant information is being presented to her via the speech signals, and, as a 
consequence will be ready to seek this information. Specifically in our experiment, when infants heard 
normal speech and saw the speaker directly gazing at them, they were simply waiting for a second signal 
to establish a referential expectation and to start to look for potential referents of the speech. In contrast, 
in the object-directed gaze conditions, their referential expectation was already evoked when the speaker 
averted her gaze, and as a result, infants were immediately ready to look for a referent. Accordingly, even 
when the object-directed gaze of the speaker was incongruent with the appearance of the object, infants 
were still faster looking at the object, compared to when they were waiting for additional cues of the 
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speaker in the infant-directed gaze condition. Thus, we propose that infants are able to interpret speech 
in different ways (i.e. either as ostensive-communicative, when they were only addressed by the speaker, 
or as referential, when the speaker is already talking about something), and in order to choose a certain 
interpretation, additional cues are required. These cues could involve the eye-gaze of the speaker, or other 
types of referential cues as well (e.g. pointing44).
Within the same communicative-referential context hypothesis, we could only speculate why infants 
were marginally slower in finding the objects when the backward speaking person also provided an 
averted referential gaze, compared to when the speaker was gazing at them. From previous studies we 
know that backward speech cannot be processed similarly to any natural languages3,30,31, thus it cannot 
establish any communicative-referential context. Moreover, since infants are expecting human faces to 
produce human sounds45, when they perceive backward speech, they likely get puzzled by the strange 
vocalization of the human face. Thus, it is difficult to make any precise predictions about the effect of 
the combination of backward speech and eye-gaze of the speaker in eliciting referential expectation. The 
marginal slowdown might be because infants got confused by perceiving a referential cue from a person, 
who was at the same time producing non-human sounds, and they were waiting for additional referential 
cues (e.g. normal speech), to eliminate their confusion, by attaining coherent cues of the speaker.
A further question is why in the No Speech condition eye-gaze did not have any modulatory effect on 
infants’ looking time latency. This result seems to conflict with studies showing that both newborns and 
infants from a very early age tend to follow the direction of eye-gaze movements35. However, while typi-
cal studies on gaze following do not involve speech as an additional variable, in our experiments infants 
always saw a person who was either talking or silently moving the lips. Hence, infants in the No Speech 
condition were not simply influenced by the eye-gaze of the actor, but also by the lack of speech, which 
was even more salient, since the actor was still moving her lips, but without producing any sounds, and 
this might have had a different effect on them. Thus, we posit that our study cannot be directly compared 
to those investigating the effect of eye-gaze cuing, because in our experiments we used a combination of 
speech vs. lack of speech, which could have resulted a different effect from previous studies.
One may argue that the perceived shorter latency, rather than reflecting infants’ referential expec-
tation about speech, could be simply either a result of an increase of arousal level, due to the speech 
condition, or a decrease of infants’ attention, due to the ‘strangeness’ of the backward and silent condi-
tions. However, both the results of the behavioral experiment and the further pupil diameter analysis 
of Experiment 2 seemed to rule out this possibility. The fact that in Experiment 2 we found significant 
difference of the latency between the Normal Speech and the other two auditory conditions only in 
the Congruent Object-Directed Gaze condition, but not in the two other Gaze conditions, excludes the 
possibility that the demonstrated effect would be due to an overall attention enhancement in the Normal 
Speech condition. In fact, if speech would elicit a general increase of arousal, we should find an overall 
increase of performance in all gaze conditions, but our results did not confirm this. Another possibility 
is that rather than speech would facilitate infants’ searching behavior, it might be that the two other 
conditions slowed them down, since both of them might serve as unnatural stimuli for the infants. If this 
was the case, then we should find an overall worse performance in the Backward Speech and No Speech 
conditions, compared to the Normal Speech Condition. However, we only found a difference in the com-
parison of the Normal Speech and Backward Speech condition, but not between the Normal Speech and 
the No Speech condition, when we calculated the overall performance in the different Gaze conditions. 
Thus, we can exclude the possibility that our control conditions would have distracted subjects’ perfor-
mance, resulting an overall decrease of latency of fixation. Furthermore, additional data about changes 
of pupil diameter also confirmed these results. While during the period of the three auditory conditions 
we found similar values of average pupil size, reflecting the same arousal level in the different conditions, 
in the period of the averted gazing infants’ attention got modulated only if previously they were listening 
to the normal speech.
Hence, we propose that the only explanation for both the shorter time taken to orient toward the 
object and for the changes of pupil size is that they reflect infants’ readiness to find a potential referent of 
speech in the environment of the speaker, which supports the idea that infants at this age already show 
an important precursor in understanding the referentiality of language.
Our starting hypothesis was that understanding the referential nature of language might be a 
human-specific predisposition of infants. By testing two groups of young infants, we gave evidence that 
when young infants are exposed to a combination of speech and an object-directed gaze of the speaker, 
this will elicit referential expectation and bias them to start to look for potential referents of speech. 
However, since in our study we tested 4-month-old infants, we cannot exclude the possibility that infants 
at this age are also influenced by their experiences of the visual world, and that the referential expectation 
they express is a result of what they learned during their experience up to that point. In order to support 
a statement regarding the innateness of referential expectation about speech, one would need to show the 
same effect with neonates, who do not have yet much exposure to the visual world.
Conclusion
Our results highlight the fact that speech can be interpreted in different ways (i.e. solely 
ostensive-communicative or also referential) very early in the development, but that additional cues 
are required to choose between these possible interpretations. When a speaker only provides ostensive 
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cues along with speech (i.e. a direct-eye gaze), the interpretation is restricted to the fact that s/he wants 
to elicit the attention of the infant. However, when additional referential cues are also provided (i.e. an 
averted, thus possibly object-directed gaze of the speaker), this will establish a referential interpretation 
of speech, and infants will be ready to seek for potential referents. We found that infants at a very early 
age are already able to express signs of these different interpretations when they are exposed to speech 
and a following eye-gaze of the speaker.
Our findings shed a new light on the early learning mechanisms of infants. The fact that already at this 
early age infants show a precursor in understanding that language is a possible tool to convey messages 
and transfer knowledge means that they are also ready to learn about the world via their conspecifics. By 
being predisposed to get information from their social partners, infants can selectively attend to certain 
stimuli in their environment. Thus, by talking to infants, even if they do not understand the meanings 
of the words yet, one can effectively draw their attention towards distinct elements of their surroundings 
and, as a consequence, shape their learning processes from a very early age on.
An intriguing question is whether this early precursor in considering spoken words, as abstract sym-
bols is restricted only to linguistic stimuli, or it reflects a more general understanding of the existence 
of symbols, the fact that, independently from modality, certain stimuli (gestures, sounds, pictures) can 
represent and stand for other entities in the world. Indeed, there is some evidence that while young 
infants initially have a tendency to accept a wide range of entities as potential symbols, later they start to 
develop a unique preference towards linguistic stimuli46. Whether or not this means that they also have 
an innate understanding that regardless of modality, any types of entities could potentially be understood 
as representations for other entities, is a subject of future research.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Infants ranged in age from 3 months and 14 days to 4 months and 12 days, and were 
from Italian-speaking families. In Experiment 1 we tested 48 infants, from which 10 were excluded due 
to uncompleted trials, 6 because of fussiness and 2 because of experimental error. In Experiment 2 we 
tested 37 infants, from which we excluded 5 due to missing trials and 2 because of fussiness. Infants’ 
mean age was 4 months, 05 days in Experiment 1, and 4 months, 11 days in Experiment 2.
Our study was approved by our institutional review board, the Bioethics Committee of the International 
School for Advanced Studies. All of our experiments followed the guidelines of this committee and all of 
our protocols were approved by the committee. After being informed about the procedure, the parents 
of all participants provided written consent.
Stimuli. Infants were presented with videos of a female face and a following object. In Experiment 
1 during Normal Speech trials the female face first looked at the infant for 1 second, and said “Ciao 
bambina! Guarda! (Hi Baby! Look!) and then a pseudo word ”A gabato/lumipa/falasi!”, and finally she 
looked either to the left, or to the right side of the screen for 2 seconds. Then the face disappeared and a 
colorful toy immediately appeared for 2 seconds. In the Backward Speech trials we reversed the movies, 
so the speaker produced the same sentences in backward speech, then looked to one side, where a subse-
quent object appeared. In the No Speech Condition everything was the same, except that the sound was 
deleted from the movies. For the objects we used pictures of 8 colorful toys with a size of approximately 
25 × 25 cm. In Experiment 1 infants saw 24 movies, 8 in each condition. In Experiment 2 along with 
the previous stimuli types we also included trials when the direction of the eye-gaze of the speaker was 
incongruent with the appearance of the subsequent object, and trials what ended by an infant-directed 
gaze of the speaker (2 seconds). In Experiment 2 infants saw 27 movies, 3 in each condition (see sup-
plementary materials).
Apparatus and Procedure. Infants sat on a parent’s lap 80 cm from a 17-in. LCD screen in a sound-
proof booth. Parents were wearing eye-glasses covered by stickers to prevent them from being able to 
see the videos and influence the infants’ behaviour. Stimuli were played by a Psyscope B70 software that 
was controlled from outside by the experimenter. The sound was played from a loudspeaker located 
behind the screen. Infants were also videotaped during the experiment. Once the experimenter started 
a trial, the fixation attractor disappeared on the screen for 2 seconds and then a movie started. A Tobii 
T-120 Eye-tracker system recorded infants’ eye-movements during the experiment. Data was recorded at 
a sampling rate of 60 Hertz. Before starting the recording, we performed a 5-point calibration. Attractors 
were presented one after the other in each corner and in the center of the screen. For each attractor, we 
waited for the position of the gaze to stabilize, before presenting the next one. The difference between 
the estimated gaze position and the position of the attractor where infants were gazing at was used for 
the calibration. If calibration was not successful it was repeated. No infant was excluded due to failure 
of calibration.
To assess for temporal drift, for each trial the difference of the timestamp between consecutive sam-
ples was obtained. Given that the recording rate was at 60 Herz, the time difference between two samples 
had to be 16.6 msec. We found no significant deviation from this value.
Data analysis of latency of fixation at the visual object. We defined three windows of interest for 
the analysis of the infant eye gaze, by dividing the screen to a center, a right and a left part. Only those 
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trials, which contained at least a 3 sec long fixation of the infant towards the center while the face was 
displayed, before the appearance of the object, were included in the analysis. Trials not meeting these 
criteria were excluded due to possible ignorance of the face of the actor. Furthermore, in Experiment 1 
infants had to complete at least 4 trials in each condition, whereas in Experiment 2 they had to complete 
at least 2 trials in each condition, otherwise they were excluded from the data analysis. As dependent 
variable for the main analysis, we considered the latency of the first fixation on the object in each trial. 
Latency was calculated as the time to the first fixation on the region of interest where the object was 
presented, after object presentation. We defined a fixation as a block of at least 5 consecutive samples 
(83.33 ms) inside a ROI.
Data analysis of pupil diameter changes. To calculate changes of the pupil diameter, throughout 
the duration of the experiment, we registered both eyes’ pupil diameter in millimetres. We removed 
artifact caused by head movement and saccades from the continuous pupil diameter data by eliminating 
extreme values (lower and top percentile) for each eye independently, after which we averaged across 
both eyes to further reduce noise. Next, we proceeded to extract, for each trial, the pupil diameter data on 
two time windows of interest. The first window spanned 4 seconds and was located during the presenta-
tion of the fixation cross at the beginning of each trial (Fixation Cross period). The purpose of this win-
dow was to be used as a baseline. Our second window of interest spanned a mean of 4.5 seconds and was 
located during period in which the female speaker produced the different auditory conditions (Auditory 
Condition period). From this point, we only included in the analysis, trials for which we registered a 
minimum of 50% of valid samples during the first window of interest (fixation cross) and a minimum of 
70% of valid samples during the second windows on interest. Through this procedure, 21.2% of the total 
amount of trials was rejected. For each trial, we calculated the mean inside each time window of interest. 
In order to normalize the data, pupil diameter for the second time window was expressed in terms of 
ratio of with respect to the first window. We also performed a second analysis, identical to this one, but 
taking a time window that spanning the entire presentation of the female speaker, including the gazing. 
The mean duration of this window was 7.5 seconds and 19.55% of the total amount of trials was rejected.
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